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Abstract
This paper extensively evaluates the vulnerabil-
ity of capsule networks to different adversarial
attacks. Recent work suggests that these architec-
tures are more robust towards adversarial attacks
than other neural networks. However, our experi-
ments show that capsule networks can be fooled
as easily as convolutional neural networks.
1. Introduction
Adversarial attacks change the input of machine learning
models in a way that the model outputs a wrong result. For
neural networks these attacks were first introduced by Good-
fellow et al. (2014) with alarming results. Recently capsule
networks (CapsNets) (Sabour et al., 2017) have been shown
to be a reasonable alternative to convolutional neural net-
works (ConvNets). Frosst et al. (2018) state that CapsNets
are more robust against white-box adversarial attacks than
other architectures. Adversarial robustness of CapsNets has
been previously studied by Marchisio et al. (2019), but with
focus on the evaluation of their proposed attack. Detecting
adversarial examples using the reconstruction quality of the
CapsNets has been investigated by Frosst et al. (2018). Also
Peer et al. (2018) have briefly discussed the application of
the fast gradient sign method (FGSM) (Goodfellow et al.,
2014) on CapsNets. Hinton et al. (2018) report results of the
FGSM on CapsNets using EM routing. Another established
approach for CapsNets is the dynamic routing algorithm
(Sabour et al., 2017).
In this paper, we will focus on these variants of CapsNets
and investigate their robustness against common adversarial
attacks. In particular, we compare the results of four differ-
ent attacks on CapsNets trained on different datasets and
examine the transferability of adversarial perturbations. We
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will show that CapsNets are in general not more robust to
adversarial attacks than ConvNets.
Our paper is structured as followed: in Sec. 2 we recapitulate
the idea of CapsNets and the dynamic routing algorithm. In
Sec. 3 we describe the attacks we apply to CapsNets. We
summarize our experiments and results in Sec. 4.
2. Capsule Networks and Dynamic Routing
The concept of vector capsules and the dynamic routing al-
gorithm was proposed by Sabour et al. (2017). In an essence,
neurons are grouped into vectors, so-called capsules. Each
capsule vector is dedicated to a distinct abstract entity, i.e. a
single object class in a classification setting. The norm of
a capsule vector encodes the probability of the represented
object being present in the input, while the vector orienta-
tion encodes the object’s characteristics. Thus, CapsNets
aim to develop dedicated representations that are distributed
into multiple vectors in contrast to convolutional networks
that utilize an entangled representation in a single vector
at a given location. This allows the application of linear
transformations directly to the representations of respective
entities. Spatial relations, which can be implemented as a
matrix product, can thus be modeled more efficiently.
CapsNets are organized in layers. Initially, the original
CapsNet applies a convolutional layer. The resulting fea-
ture maps are then processed by the primary capsule layer.
Internally, it applies a series of convolutional layers on its
own, each yielding a spatial grid of capsules. Within all
capsule layers the squashing function serves as a vector-
to-vector non-linearity that squashes each capsule vector
length between 0 and 1 while leaving the orientation unal-
tered. Subsequently, convolutional or densely connected
capsule layers can be applied. While the latter does not
utilize weight sharing, convolutional capsule layers share
the kernels over the spatial grid, as well as capsules from
the previous layer. These layers effectively estimate output
capsules based on respective input capsules. The dynamic
routing algorithm determines each agreement between es-
timate and iteratively calculated output capsule. This is
done by introducing a scalar factor, the so-called routing
coefficient, for each connection between an estimate and
respective output. Such an output is defined as the sum over
all respective estimates, weighted by their routing coeffi-
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cients. Theoretically, that means information flows where it
is needed, both during forward and backpropagation. This
non-parametric procedure supports the goal of capsules with
clean dedicated representations. To improve results, an addi-
tional capsule may be used within the routing algorithm to
serve as a dead end for information that may not be linked
to known abstract capsule categories. This is also referred
to as the none-of-the-above category.
3. Adversarial Attacks
Adversarial attacks can be performed in different settings:
white-box attacks compute the gradient of the networks
output with respect to the input, whereas in the black-box
setting such calculations are not possible. Furthermore,
adversarial attacks can be classified into targeted attacks,
where the goal of the attack is that the network assigns
a chosen label to the manipulated image, and untargeted
attacks, where the attacker’s goal is to fool the network in
the sense that it missclassifies a given image.
Throughout this paper we denote the input image as x ∈
[0, 1]n×n, the neural network’s output logits as Z(x) and
the perturbation as δ. If F (x) is the output of the network
interpretable as probability, then F (x) = softmax(Z(x))
in the case of the ConvNet and Z(x) = arctanh(2F (x)−1)
in the case of the CapsNet. We refer to the label assigned
to x by the networks as C(x) and to the correct label of x
by C∗(x). Furthermore, we denote the i-th entry of Z(x)
as Z(x)i.
3.1. Carlini-Wagner Attack
The Carlini-Wagner (CW) attack (2017) is a targeted white-
box attack and performed by solving the following con-
strained optimization problem
minimize
δ
||δ||2 + c ·max(G(x, δ, t)− Z(x)t,−κ)
subject to x+ δ ∈ [0, 1]n×n,
(1)
where G(x, δ, t) := maxi 6=t(Z(x + δ)i) and c > 0. The
parameter κ > 0 controls the confidence. The optimal value
for c, i.e. the smallest value, that results in an adversarial
example, is found using a binary search. To ensure the
box-constraint on x+ δ the authors suggested the following
transform of variables
δ =
1
2
(tanh(w) + 1)− x, (2)
where the tanh-function is applied componentwise. After
this transformation the optimization problem is treated as
unconstrained and can be solved in terms of w using the
Adam optimizer (Kingma & Ba, 2014). Carlini and Wagner
(2017) also proposed two different approaches to handle
the box-constraint: projected gradient descent and clipped
gradient descent. For details we refer the reader to the
original work (Carlini & Wagner, 2017).
3.2. Boundary Attack
The idea of the boundary attack as introduced by Brendel et
al. (2017) is to sample a perturbation which leads to a miss-
classification of the original image x(0) := x. Additionally,
the desired perturbation should have the smallest possible
norm. The initial perturbation δ(0) is sampled component-
wise from a uniform distribution δ(0)ij ∼ U(0, 1). Initial
perturbations, which are not missclassified, are rejected.
During the attack adversarial images are constructed itera-
tively x(k+1) := x(k) + δ(k) by a random walk close to the
decision boundary. During this random walk the following
three conditions are enforced by appropriate scaling and
clipping of the image and the perturbation:
1. The new image x(k+1) is in the range of a valid image,
i.e. in x(k+1) ∈ [0, 1]n×n.
2. The proportion of the size of the perturbation δ(k) and
the distance to the given image is equal to a given
parameter γ.
3. The reduction of the distance from the adversarial im-
age to the original image d(x, x(k))− d(x, x(k+1)) is
proportional to d(x, x(k)) with ν > 0.
The parameters γ and ν are adjusted dynamically, similarly
to Trust Region methods.
3.3. DeepFool Attack
DeepFool is an untargeted white-box attack developed by
Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. (2016). The authors found that
minimal adversarial perturbations for affine multiclass clas-
sifiers can be computed exactly and quickly, by calculating
the distance to the (linear) decision boundaries and making
an orthogonal projection to the nearest boundary. DeepFool
initializes δ(0) ← 0 and then iteratively approximates F
with its first degree Taylor polynomial at x+δ(k), computes
a perturbation ∆δ(k) for this approximation as described
above and updates δ(k+1) ← δ(k) + ∆δ(k). For better re-
sults, we restrict the norm of ∆δ(k) each step k.
3.4. Universal Adversarial Perturbations
A universal perturbation is a single vector δ ∈ Rn×n, such
that C(x + δ) 6= C∗(x) for multiple x sampled from the
input image distribution. This concept was proposed by
Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. (2017) and we use a variation of
their algorithm, which we briefly describe in the following.
As long as the accuracy on the test set is above a previously
chosen threshold, repeat these steps:
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Table 1. Average perturbation norms for each attack and archi-
tecture.
Attack Network MNIST Fashion SVHN CIFAR10
CW ConvNet 1.40 0.51 0.67 0.37CapsNet 1.82 0.50 0.60 0.23
Boundary ConvNet 3.07 1.24 2.42 1.38CapsNet 3.26 0.93 1.88 0.72
DeepFool ConvNet 1.07 0.31 0.41 0.23CapsNet 2.02 0.55 0.80 0.16
Universal ConvNet 6.71 2.61 2.46 2.45CapsNet 11.45 5.31 8.59 2.70
Table 2. Fooling rates of adversarial examples calculated for a
CapsNet and evaluated on a ConvNet and vice versa. For the
universal attack we report the accuracy on the whole test set.
Attack Network MNIST Fashion SVHN CIFAR10
CW ConvNet 0.8% 1.2% 2.8% 2.4%CapsNet 2.0% 2.0% 3.8% 2.0%
Boundary ConvNet 8.8% 9.5% 10.5% 13.4%CapsNet 14.2% 14.6% 12.9% 26.1%
DeepFool ConvNet 4.3% 8.5% 13.5% 11.8%CapsNet 0.9% 10.9% 10.8% 14.1%
Universal ConvNet 4.9% 20.4% 35.0% 25.9%CapsNet 38.2% 25.7% 53.4% 47.2%
1. Initialize δ(0) ← 0.
2. Sample a batchX(k) = {x(k)1 , ..., x(k)N } of images with
∀x ∈ X(k) : C(x+ δ(k)) = C∗(x).
3. For each x(k)i compute a perturbation δ
(k+1)
i using
FGSM (Goodfellow et al., 2014).
4. Update the perturbation:
δ(k+1) ← δ(k) + 1
N
N∑
i=0
δ
(k+1)
i
Since this method depends on the FGSM it is a white-box
attack.
4. Experiments
4.1. Datasets and Network Architectures
We train models on each of the following benchmark
datasets: MNIST (LeCun et al., 1998), Fashion-MNIST
(Xiao et al., 2017), SVHN (Netzer et al., 2011) and CIFAR-
10 (Krizhevsky & Hinton, 2009). Each dataset consists of
ten different classes. As a baseline architecture we use a
ConvNet which we trained on each of the datasets using
batch-normalization (Ioffe & Szegedy, 2015) and dropout
(Srivastava et al., 2014). Since training CapsNets can be
rather difficult in practice, we had to carefully select appro-
priate architectures:
Like Sabour et al. (2017) we use a three layer CapsNet
for the MNIST dataset, where we only used 64 convolu-
tional kernels in the first layer. For the Fashion-MNIST and
the SVHN dataset we use two convolutional layers at the
beginning (32 and 32 channels with 3× 3 filter for Fashion-
MNIST, 64 and 256 channels with 5× 5 filter for SVHN),
followed by a convolutional capsule layer with 8D capsules,
32 filter with size 9 × 9 and a stride of 2, and finally a
capsule layer with one 16D capsule per class. Since Caps-
Nets have problems with more complex data like CIFAR10
(Xi et al., 2017), we use a modified DCNet (Phaye et al.,
2018) with three convolutional capsule layers and so-called
none-of-the-above category for the dynamic routing for this
dataset. We train all CapsNet architectures using the margin
loss and the reconstruction loss for regularization (Sabour
et al., 2017).
For each dataset we calculate 1000 adversarial examples
on images randomly chosen from the test set using the
DeepFool attack and the boundary attack. For the Carlini-
Wagner attack we calculate 500 adversarial examples again
on random samples from the test set (with hyperparameter
κ = 1). The target labels too are chosen at random, but
different from the true labels. To evaluate the performance
of universal perturbation we split the test set in ten parts
and compute ten adversarial perturbations according to the
procedure described in Sec. 3.4 on each part.
None of the attacks restrict the norm of the perturbation.
This means, the Carlini-Wagner, the boundary and the Deep-
Fool attack generate only valid adversarial examples. In the
case of the universal perturbation, we stop once accuracy
falls below 50%.
4.2. Results
We are aware of the fact that the test accuracies shown in
Tab. 3 of our models are not state-of-the-art. However, we
found our models to be suitable for the given task, since
the similar performances of ConvNets and CapsNets ensure
comparability.
We also compare the average Euclidean norm of the pertur-
bation for each attack, dataset and network. The results are
displayed in Tab. 1. Our main result is that applying the
Carlini-Wagner attack on the CapsNets yields smaller ad-
versarial perturbations than on the ConvNet. Nevertheless,
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Table 3. Test accuracies achieved by our networks.
Network MNIST Fashion-MNIST SVHN CIFAR10
ConvNet 99.39% 92.90% 92.57% 88.22%
CapsNet 99.40% 92.65% 92.35% 88.21%
for most of the dataset we found that the DeepFool attack
performs worse on the CapsNets.
To compare the transferability of adversarial examples we
calculate perturbations on the ConvNet and apply those to
the CapsNet and vice versa (see Tab. 2). In case of the
(targeted) Carlini-Wagner (CW) attack we define a network
fooled if the perturbed image is classified with the target
label. For the Carlini-Wagner attack, the boundary attack
and the DeepFool attack our results fit to those displayed
in Tab. 1. Especially the perturbations calculated using
the universal attack seem to generalize well on the other
architecture. For this attack we also found out that the
smaller perturbations calculated on the ConvNet can be
successfully transferred to CapsNets, while the other way
around this approach was less effective, although the norms
of the perturbations for the CapsNets are very large.
The adversarial examples for the CapsNets calculated with
the Carlini-Wagner, the boundary and the DeepFool attack
are not visible for the human eye. Only the universal pertur-
bations are observable (see Fig. 1).
CW
Boundary
DeepFool
Universal
Figure 1. Original images from the CIFAR10 dataset (left), adver-
sarial images (middle) and the corresponding perturbation (right)
calculated for a CapsNet.
4.3. Visualizing Universal Perturbations
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Figure 2. Two dimensional embedding of the universal perturba-
tions calculated using t-SNE (Maaten & Hinton, 2008). The upper
right cluster represents perturbations calculated on a ConvNet,
whereas the lower left cluster represents those calculated on a
CapsNet. Perturbations with the same color were created using the
same subset of test data.
We also visualized the universal perturbations calculated for
the CapsNet and for the ConvNet using t-SNE (Maaten &
Hinton, 2008) and we observe that the perturbations for the
CapsNet seem to be inherently different than the perturba-
tions for the ConvNets (see Fig. 2).
5. Conclusion
Our experiments show that CapsNets are not in general more
robust to white-box attacks. With sufficiently sophisticated
attacks CapsNets can be fooled as easily as ConvNets. Our
experiments also show that the vulnerability of CapsNets
and ConvNets is similar and it is hard to decide which
model is more prone to adversarial attacks than the other.
Moreover, we showed that adversarial examples can be
transferred between the two architectures.
To fully understand the possibly distinguishable roles of the
convolutional and capsule layers with respect to adversarial
attacks, we are currently examining the effects of attacks on
the activation level of single neurons. However, this analysis
is not finished yet and beyond the scope of this paper.
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